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Conflicts Between a Bank's Common Law Right of
Setoff and a Secured Party's Interest in Identifiable
Proceeds
It is well established that a bank has a common law right of setoff
against funds on deposit with it when the relationship between the
bank and the depositor is that of mutual debtor-creditor and the
depositor's debt has fully matured.' When the funds on deposit with
the bank belong to a person other than the depositor, the majority
rule is that the bank's right of setoff will prevail over the rights of
the third person to the monies on deposit if the bank set off without
knowledge or notice of the third party's interest.3 In minority rule
jurisdictions, setoff is allowed only if the bank changed its position
in reliance on the deposit.4
Section 9-306(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code 5 (Code) provides that a security interest continues in any identifiable proceeds
resulting from the sale, exchange or other disposition of collateral
including collections received by the debtor. Section 9-306(1) of the
Code' states that if a secured creditor's collateral is sold or otherwise
disposed of by his debtor, whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds will
be considered "proceeds." They may be either cash proceeds, such
as money, checks and deposit accounts, or non-cash proceeds.
If a debtor deposits cash proceeds7 into a bank account other than
the creditor's, and the bank exercises its right of setoff without
knowledge or notice8 that the funds on deposit are proceeds, or after
1. Setoff has been defined as "that right which exists between two parties, each of whom
under an independent contract owes an ascertained amount to the other, to set off his respective debt by way of mutual deduction..." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1538 (4th ed. 1968).
In addition to common law right of setoff, a few states have empowered banks to set off by
statute. See note 26 infra. The right of setoff may also be established contractually between
a bank and its depositor by inclusion of such a provision in the documents evidencing indebtedness.
2. See note 10 infra and accompanying text.
3. See note 21 infra and accompanying text.
4. See note 25 infra and accompanying text.
5. U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1972 version) [hereinafter cited as 9-306(2)]. Unless otherwise
indicated in the text or footnotes, all citations to the Uniform Commercial Code and its
Comments are to the 1972 version of the Code.
6. U.C.C. § 9-306(1).
7. In accounts receivable financing the collateral itself is proceeds; in inventory financing
the secured party expects that the inventory will be sold and that he will receive the proceeds.,
or a portion thereof. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 677, 732 (1st
ed. 1965).
8. See notes 86 and 87 infra and accompanying text.
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changing its position in reliance on the deposit, will 9-306(2) prevail
in the interest of the secured party, or does the bank's right of setoff
operate to defeat the interest of the secured party?
COMMON LAW ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT OF SETOFF

When money is deposited in a bank, the bank becomes the debtor
of the depositor to the extent of the deposit If the depositor is
indebted to the bank on a matured obligation under a separate
financing arrangement, a mutual indebtedness arises which the
bank may extinguish by setting off its debt against the amount of
the depositor's debt.'" There are, however, restrictions placed on the
exercise of setoff. The indebtedness between the bank and depositor
must be mutual;" the account must not be opened for a special or
limited purpose;'" and the deposit must not be a trust account of
which the bank had actual or constructive notice. 3 Most importantly, setoff will be allowed only when the debt to the bank has
matured.'"
The debt of the depositor to the bank may be created simultaneously with, subsequent to, or antecedent to the deposit.'5 Most
courts hold that all three situations constitute transfers for value
which cut off all prior equities, including those of the depositor.'"
The rule in the simultaneous debt situation results because a deposit is made in exchange for the extension of credit.'7 A subsequent
debt situation constitutes a transfer for value since credit is extended in reliance on the existing deposit.'" Finally, where a setoff
is made in satisfaction of an antecedent debt, these courts recognize
a transfer for value.' 9
9. See, e.g., Auten v. United States Nat'l Bank, 174 U.S. 125 (1899); Cicero State Bank
v. Crowley, 115 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir, 1940); People v. McGraw Electric Co., 375 II. 241, 30
N.E.2d 903 (1941).
10. See, e.g., Central Nat'l Bank v. Conn. Mut. Ins. Co., 104 U.S. 54 (1881); Irish v.
Citizens Trust Co., 163 F. 880 (2d Cir. 1908); Whitewater Commercial & Say. Bank v. United
States Bank of Crystal Lake, 224 I1. App. 26 (1922).
11. See note 10 supra.
12. See, e.g., Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U.S. 354 (1889).
13. See, e.g., Purdy v. Bank of America, 2 Cal. 2d 298, 40 P.2d 481 (1935).
14. See, e.g., American Sur. Co. v. Bank of Italy, 63 Cal. App. 149, 218 P. 466 (1923).
15. Note, Right of Bank to Set Off Deposit against a Depositor'sDebt Despite Undisclosed
Equity, 38 HARV. L. REV. 800, 801 (1925).
16. A transferee for value took title free of prior equities under the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law §§ 52, 57, and this position has been continued by U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-305.
17. Compare Central Nat'l Bank v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 104 U.S. 54 (1881) (majority
view) with Bank of Metropolis v. New England Bank, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 234 (1843), aff'd on
second appeal, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 212 (1848) (minority view).
18. Cf. Garrison v. Union Trust Co., 139 Mich. 392, 102 N.W. 978 (1905).
19. Cf. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); see also, Comment, Contracts - Bills
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Based on these reasons, the majority of jurisdictions adhere to a
knowledge/notice rule in determining rights of setoff against rights
of third parties.'" If a bank has neither knowledge nor notice of facts
sufficient to put it on inquiry that the deposited funds actually belong to a third party, it may apply the funds to the depositor's debt
to the bank.2
The minority of courts concur with the majority in viewing a
simultaneous debt situation as a transfer for value, but hold that
subsequent and antecedent" debts do not create a greater equity in
the bank than the true owner of the funds. 3 These courts, which
have adopted an equitable or federal rule, 4 take the position that
even though a bank has no express or implied knowledge that someone other than the depositor has an interest in the funds, the bank
and Nots- Precedent Debt as Consideration in the Law of Contracts and Negotiable
Instruments, 46 MicH. L. REV. 211 (1947).
20. Central Nat'l Bank v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 104 U.S. 54 (1881), one of the oldest
cases supporting the majority position, rests on the premise that setoff "cannot be permitted
to prevail against the equity of the beneficial owner, of which the bank has notice, either
actual or constructive." 104 U.S. at 71. The majority rule is subscribed to by approximately
29 states. See Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 246 (1966); 9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking §§302, 304 (1938);
10 AM. JUR. 2d Banks § 676 (1963); Dobyns, Banking Setoff: A Study in Commercial
Obsolescence, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1585, 1586 n.8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Dobyns]. Five of
these states subscribe to the majority rule by statute. Dobyns at 1586-87 n.9. The number of
states adhering to the majority position is an approximation only.
21. See, e.g., Kerner v. Kinsey, 384 Ill. 180, 51 N.E.2d 126 (1943); Chicago Title & Trust
Co. v. Central Trust Co., 312 Ill. 396, 144 N.E. 165 (1924); First Nat'l Bank v. City Nat'l
Bank, 102 Mo. App. 357, 76 S.W. 489 (1903); American Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Bradley Constr. Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 278, 19 A.2d 242 (1941).
22. However, since the enactment of the Code, the theory that the satisfaction of an
antecedent debt is not a transfer for value has changed drastically. See U.C.C. § 3-303.
23. See, e.g., Wilson v. Smith, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 763 (1845); Shotwell v. Sioux Falls Say.
Bank, 34 S.D. 109, 147 N.W. 288 (1914).
24. Bank of Metropolis v. New England Bank, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 234 (1843), aff'd on second
appeal, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 212 (1848) stated that the bank's right of setoff was dependent upon
extending credit or allowing balances to remain outstanding upon the faith of negotiable
paper "transmitted or expected to be transmitted in the usual course of dealings ..
" 47
U.S. (6 How.) at 227 (emphasis added). Later judicial interpretations of the case overlooked
the Court's reference to expected funds, and thereby limited a bank's right of setoff to
instances in which the extension of credit was made on the strength of funds presently on
deposit.
Although Bank of Metropolis is credited with developing the equitable rule, some commentators argue that this is only the result of a misconstruction of the holding and that the case
itself fails to stand for the minority position as it currently exists. See W. Tomlin, Banks and
Banking-Equitable Remedies-Set-Off and Counterclaim-BankHeld to Have No Right to
Offset Against the Account of Depositor W~ho Holds Funds in Trust for the Beneficial Owner,
Regardless of A bsence of Notice to the Bank. National Indemnity Co. v. Spring Branch State
Bank, 348 S. W.2d 528 (Tex. 1961), 40 TEx. L. REv. 394, 395-96 (1962).
This position evolved into the present minority rule which is held by approximately 8
states. See Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 249 (1966). Note, however, that recently Michigan adopted
the knowledge/notice rule, and Oklahoma and South Dakota adhere also to the knowledge/notice rule by statute. See Dobyns, supra note 20, at 1586-87.
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cannot apply these funds to satisfy the depositor's debt unless the
bank changed its position, for example, by relying on the deposited
funds as security for a loan."5 This usually occurs in a simultaneous
debt situation."
When the third party is a holder of a perfected security interest
in cash proceeds which the debtor/depositor has deposited in a general account, the stage is set for a potential conflict between the
bank and the secured party over the disposition of proceeds. Central
to the resolution of such conflict is an understanding of the concept
of identifiability of proceeds. Thus, a brief discussion of that concept follows.
IDENTIFIABILITY OF PROCEEDS

Section 9-306(2) provides that a security interest continues in
identifiable proceeds. For cash proceeds, however, this continuity is
destroyed after a period of ten days,2" unless the secured party has
filed a financing statement for the original collateral. 8 If this procedure is followed, the security interest is continuously perfected in
identifiable cash proceeds.
The issue of identifiability of cash proceeds is relevant to a bank's
right of setoff because a security interest does not continue unless
the proceeds are identifiable. Hence, a setoff against unidentifiable
cash proceeds would not create a conflict between a bank and a
secured party, because the secured party has no further interest in
the proceeds. When an account contains only proceeds, whether the
account be general or special, there is no problem with identifiability. However, when proceeds are commingled with other funds in a
general account, a question arises whether the proceeds continue to
be identifiable. If they are identifiable, then the security interest
25. See, e.g., Sherts v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 342 Pa. 337, 21 A.2d 18 (1941); National Indem.
Co. v. Spring Branch State Bank, 162 Tex. 521, 348 S.W.2d 528 (1961).
26. It would seem logical that a bank might also change its position based on an antecedent or subsequent debt situation. In a subsequent debt situation, a bank might extend credit
in reliance on the fact that a deposit account already exists against which it could set off. In
an antecedent debt situation, a bank might contractually provide at the time it extends
credit, that a deposit account be established in the future. However, the courts following the
equitable/federal rule do not agree with this analysis.
27. U.C.C. § 9-306(3) [hereinafter cited as 9-306(3)].
28. U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(b) [hereinafter cited as 9-306(3)(b)]. This section provides in
pertinent part:
The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected security interest if the
interest in the original collateral was perfected but it ceases to be a perfected
security interest and becomes unperfected ten days after receipt of the proceeds by
the debtor unless. . . (b) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral
and the proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds. ..
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remains and any attempt by a bank to setoff against those funds
undoubtedly would be contested by the secured party.
Professor Gilmore, the principal draftsman and reporter for Article Nine of the Code, states that commingling proceeds with other
funds destroys their identifiability. "If a secured party allows his
debtor to make and keep collections, he loses his interest (except for
a limited right in insolvency proceedings) when the collections are
commingled with other deposits in the debtor's bank account.""
Under Gilmore's theory, the loss of the security interest is occasioned by the fact that a debtor retains complete control over proceeds deposited in his own general account by virtue of his power
over the account. This position is derived from the holding in
Benedict v. Ratner.30 According to that rule, a debtor's dominion
over property subject to a security interest, including the ability to
dispose of and apply proceeds to his own use, constitutes a fraudulent conveyance as to other creditors, 3 which can be set aside by
them, thereby terminating the security interest.
The Benedict rule required, in order to protect a security interest
in proceeds, that a separate bank account only for proceeds be
maintained by the debtor and policed by the secured party, which
made it a simple matter to trace identifiable proceeds. However, as
the court in Michigan National Bank v. Flowers Mobile Homes
Sales32 noted: "such cumbersome formalities. . . seem hardly compatible with the stated underlying purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code 'to simplify . . .the law governing commercial transactions' and 'to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties.' 133
Citing 9-205 3 with respect to commingling and 9-306(3) in regard
to identifiability, the court could find "no statutory definition of
'identifiable proceeds' . . .[W]e also find no express limitation on
the right of a secured party to trace proceeds subject to his security
interest into a bank account of the debtor. This lack of limitation
29. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 736 (1st ed. 1965). Gilmore
also cites the inclusion of a special provision in 9-306(4) (d) for commingled proceeds as further
support for his position. According to Gilmore if a security interest in proceeds is not destroyed when proceeds are commingled, then there would be no need to include such a special
provision in the insolvency subsection of 9-306. Contrary to this position, the insolvency
section was so drafted in order to ease the burden of the secured party on insolvency. Under
9-306(4)(d) a secured creditor is not burdened with identifying proceeds before he can recover.
30. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
31. Accord, Morrison Steel Co. v. Gurtman, 113 N.J. Super. 474, 274 A.2d 306 (1971).
32. 26 N.C. App. 690, 217 S.E.2d 108 (1975).
33. Id. at 694, 217 S.E.2d at 112, citing G.S. § 25-1-102(2) (1975).
34. U.C.C. § 9-205 [hereinafter cited as 9-205].
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is not without significance."35
in accord with Michigan National Bank, the majority of postCode decisions " and the Code itself contradict the Gilmore position.
Section 9-205 specifically overrules the holding of Benedict v.
Ratner, and provides that a security interest is not invalid against
creditors by reason of the debtor's liberty to use, commingle or
dispose of proceeds. The language of this section indicates that the
fact that proceeds are deposited into a special or general account is
not a critical factor in determining whether a security interest continues in proceeds.
The court in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First National Bank of Blue Island37 explained 9-205 "is explicit in preserving the priority of the secured party to the proceeds notwithstanding
his consent to the sale of the primary collateral and further notwithstanding his consent to the debtor's unrestricted use and disposition
of these proceeds so long as they remain identifiable."3 The court
concluded that despite Gilmore's opinion, an examination of the
language of the Code, in view of its purpose, indicates that "the
more reasonable implication is that the proceeds may be identifiable, and the security interest therein survive, even though commingled." 39 Therefore, commingling, in and of itself, cannot be said to
destroy identifiability.
However, determining what constitutes identifiable proceeds
remains a difficult task. Since the Code does not define
"identifiable," many courts have turned to trust law for assistance
in ascertaining the meaning of the term." The relationship between
the secured party and his debtor has been likened to that between
the beneficiary of a trust and his trustee. Proceeds are therefore
equated with trust funds, and identifiability with traceability.
35. 26 N.C. App. at 693, 217 S.E.2d at 111.
36. See text accompanying notes 37-39 infra; Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers
Bank of Portageville, 358 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Associates Discount Corp. v. Fidelity
Union Trust Co., 111 N.J. Super. 353, 268 A.2d 330 (1970). See also Girard Trust Corn
Exchange Bank v. Lepley Ford, Inc., 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 395 (Pa. Ct.Comm. P. 1958). In
Howarth v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 203 F. Supp. 279 (1962), the court assumed that if
proceeds could be traced into a bank account they remained identifiable.
37. 504 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying note 67 infra for a more complete
discussion of the facts.
38. 504 F.2d at 1002, quoting In re Mid State Wood Products Co., 323 F. Supp. 853, 857
(N.D. I1. 1971).
39. 504 F.2d at 1002.
40. U.C.C. § 1-103 [hereinafter cited as 1-103], provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant
and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause
shall supplement its provisions."
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Under trust principles, it is conclusively presumed that when a
trustee deposits trust funds into his personal account, and thereafter dissipates a portion of the funds contained in that account, the
amounts so dissipated are personal funds and not trust funds.4 If
the trustee withdraws more than the amount of his own funds,
thereby diminishing the trust funds, and subsequently makes additional deposits of personal funds to the account, the beneficiary has
no claim to the later deposits, but can only enforce an equitable lien
against the account to the extent of the trust funds remaining. This
is commonly referred to as the "lowest intermediate balance rule."4
However, if the trustee deposits personal funds, manifesting an intention to make restitution of the trust funds, the beneficiary can
then assert a claim to these additional amounts, as well as to the
trust funds remaining in the account." Courts have used this approach to determine whether proceeds are identifiable.
In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First National Bank of
Blue Island,44 the defendant bank set off a personal note against the
debtor's corporate account, which contained proceeds subject to a
perfected security interest. The bank asserted lack of identifiability
of proceeds as a defense.
Looking to Illinois law concerning funds impressed with a trust,
the court stated that trust funds may be traced into a fund of commingled assets, and that it is conclusively presumed in equity that
a trustee dissipates or spends his own funds first, before invading
the trust fund.
In this case, the bank set off nearly one-half of the account, and
on the same day paid out most of the remainder in the ordinary
course of business by honoring checks drawn by the debtor. The
actual order in which these transactions occurred was not considered by the court. The bank argued that the part of the account set
off did not contain the secured party's proceeds, but implied that
the proceeds were contained in that portion of the account paid out
in the ordinary course of business. The issue raised by the bank was
not explicitly resolved, but nevertheless the secured party was held
to have successfully identified the proceeds.
In Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank of
41. People v. People's Bank and Trust of Rockford, 353 Ill. 479, 187 N.E. 522 (1933); Perry
v. Perry, 484 S.W.2d 257 (Mo. 1972).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §202, Comment j (1959).
43. Id., Comment m.
44. 504 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying note 67 infra for a more complete
discussion of the facts.

19781

Conflicts Over Proceeds

Portageville,5 the plaintiff, a commercial financer, held a perfected
security interest in the new car inventory of the debtor automobile
dealer, and in the proceeds from their sale. It was the debtor's
practice to deposit the proceeds of each car sold into a checking
account held with the defendant bank, and to remit payments to the
financer in the form of checks drawn on this account. The funds over
which the dispute arose derived from the sale of six cars. Upon the
sale of each car, the debtor deposited the check received from the
purchaser into his checking account. The six deposits were made
within a period of twenty-eight days. On the last day, while part of
the proceeds remained in the account and remittance checks were
outstanding to the secured party, the bank set off against the
debtor's account for a debt arising from a demand promissory note.
In a suit by the secured party to recover proceeds from the bank,
the court concluded that proceeds would be identifiable if they
could be traced in accordance with state law and, in this instance,
analogized general accounts containing proceeds to constructive
trusts. In tracing the proceeds, the court decided that deposits other
than proceeds made by the debtor within the twenty-eight day period had not been made with the intent of restitution. Therefore,
only the deposits of proceeds would be treated as additions to a trust
fund. Applying the lowest intermediate balance rule,46 the court
subtracted the amount of proceeds remaining in the account at the
time the bank exercised its setoff from the balance in the account
on that date. The court allowed the bank to keep the remainder, and
awarded the traceable proceeds to the secured party. 7 The secured
party had shown that the proceeds remaining in the account were
identifiable because they had been successfully traced, and therefore the security interest in these proceeds continued under 9306(3). The secured party was not able to identify those proceeds
withdrawn from the account prior to the setoff. Therefore, it held
no further security interest in them. 8
45. 358 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Mo. 1973). See text accompanying note 71 infra for a more
complete discussion of the facts.
46. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
47. 358 F. Supp. at 325-27.
48. For an example of a situation in which funds in an account are always in excess of
proceeds, see Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Flowers Mobile Homes Sales, Inc., 26 N.C. App. 690,
217 S.E.2d 108(1975). Although this case did not involve setoff, it dealt with principles of
identifiability of proceeds. This was a suit brought by a secured party against its debtor and
the debtor's judgment creditor. Under applicable state law, the judgment creditor had levied
on the debtor's bank account at a time when it contained proceeds, thereby causing the bank
to dishonor for insufficient funds a check issued to the secured party by the debtor as payment
of proceeds.
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Summarizing the approach of these courts, proceeds are identifiable, even if commingled with other funds, if they can be definitely
traced from cash proceeds in the hands of the debtor to deposits into
his deposit account. Such proceeds can be recovered by a secured
party if they were not paid out to a third party in the ordinary course
of business, and it will be presumed that other funds in the account
are paid out before proceeds. If a secured party can successfully
identify proceeds in a bank account using tracing principles under
trust law, his perfected security interest continues in the proceeds.
Under these circumstances, a secured party's rights inevitably conflict with a bank's right to setoff against an account containing
proceeds.
EFFECT OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ON SETOFF AGAINST

PROCEEDS

In Associates Discount Corp. v. Fidelity Union Trust Co.,"5 a New
Jersey trial court held that 9-306(2) of the Code abrogates the common law right of setoff against an account containing proceeds. The
secured party in the case held a perfected security interest in nine
trucks and any proceeds arising from their disposition. The debtor
sold the trucks and deposited the proceeds into its account with a
bank. The bank also held a security interest in six other used trucks
of the debtor. The debtor defaulted under the bank's security agreement and, after demand for payment remained unsatisfied, the
bank set off the amount due against the funds on deposit in the
debtor's bank account.
The court stated that under 9-104(i),1° Article Nine does not apply
to any right of setoff, and noted that:
This section, however, cannot mean that a general creditor, as the
bank is here with respect to the funds in question, may abrogate a
perfected security interest simply by having a right to and opporSince at all times up to the date of the levy the bank account contained funds sufficient to
honor a check in payment of proceeds, the court held that all withdrawals were against funds
other than proceeds.
Applying the standard tracing rule, the proceeds from the sale of the original collateral would thus be 'identifiable,' because it is presumed that they remained untouched in the bank from the day of their deposit to the day the checking account
was seized. The proceeds in the account thus remained subject to plaintiff's security
interest.
26 N.C. App. at 693, 217 S.E.2d at 111.
49. 111 N.J. Super. 353, 268 A.2d 330 (1970).
50. U.C.C. § 9-104(i) (1962 version). The 1972 version of this section provides: "This
"
Article does not apply . . (i) to any right of setoff ..

19781

Conflicts Over Proceeds

tunity for a set-off. All this section means is that a right of set-off
may exist in a creditor who does not have a security interest."
Pre-Code cases are subject to the "superior authority of the legislature which, by enacting the Uniform Commercial Code, continued
the plaintiffs [the secured party's] security interest in the identifiable proceeds of sales of the collateral."52
Two later decisions have considered the holding of Associates
Discount Corp., but have failed to either strongly agree with or
criticize its reasoning. In Morrison Steel Co. v. Gurtman,3 a New
Jersey Appellate Court stated: "Whether or not a right of set-off
exists is to be determined by the law of New Jersey. This determination is unaffected by the Uniform Commercial Code."54
The issue in the Morrison case, however, was not whether setoff
continued to exist under the Code, but whether, since the adoption
of the Code, a bank's right of setoff would be superior to a perfected
security interest. Rather than deciding this issue, the court remanded the case to the trial court due to the fact that the bank
which had exercised the setoff had not been joined as a party defendant. Although not necessary to its disposition of the case, the appellate court listed several pre-Code New Jersey knowledge/notice
cases which "seem[ed] to favor a holding that a right of set-off may
exist." 5 Nevertheless, the court noted that Associates Discount
Corp. should be consulted to determine the continued validity or
relevance of the earlier decisions in light of the language and legislative intent of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Associates Discount Corp. was also discussed by a federal district
court in Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank of Portageville.56 In that case the impact of Associates Discount Corp. on the
continued validity of the knowledge/notice rule was raised. After
mentioning the problem, however, no further discussion of the relationship between the two rules ensued. Therefore, a closer analysis
of the Code is necessary for a resolution of this issue.
Section 9-104(i) states that Article Nine of the Code does not
apply to any right of setoff. This means not only that it is unnecessary to perfect a security interest in order to exercise a right of setoff,
but also that setoff law remains totally unaffected by Article Nine's
codification of the rights of secured parties. Since Article Nine does
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

111 N.J. Super. at 356, 268 A.2d at 333.
Id.
113 N.J. Super. 474, 274 A.2d 306 (1971).
Id. at 481, 274 A.2d at 310, citing N.J. STAT. ANN. 12A.9-104(i) (West) (1971).
Id. at 484, 274 A.2d at 312.
358 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
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not apply to setoff, section 1-10311 takes effect, making the common
law of setoff supplemental to 9-306. Therefore, it is setoff law, rather
than 9-306, which must be applied to determine whether a proper
setoff against identifiable proceeds has been exercised.
Section 9-306(2) does not directly deny a right of setoff against
proceeds. However, proponents of the rights of secured parties to
identifiable proceeds argue that unless 9-306(2) eliminates a bank's
common law right of setoff against proceeds, the operation of 9306(2) is rendered ineffective. This argument is exaggerated since
the right to exercise setoff against third party funds arises only in
certain limited circumstances, and only in those circumstances
would setoff defeat the interest of a secured party in identifiable
proceeds. In all other cases, a perfected security interest under 9306(2) prevails.
The conclusion that setoff can defeat a security interest in proceeds is consistent with other provisions of the Code, which indicate
that despite 9-306(2), the drafters did not intend the rights of a
secured party in proceeds to be inviolate. Security interests in proceeds can be terminated in a number of ways. One who receives
proceeds from the debtor in the ordinary course of business takes
free of a secured party's claim,58 and a holder in due course of negotiable proceeds takes priority over an earlier perfected security interest.59 In view of the deliberate exclusion of setoff from Article Nine
under 9-104(i), the drafters also evidenced an intent that a bank,
properly exercising its right of setoff, should take free of a secured
party's interest in proceeds."
A basic rule of statutory construction is that when a particular
section of a statute, or the intent of the legislators underlying that
statute is unclear, consideration should be given to similar sections
of the same statute for clarification."' If the drafters of the Code had
57. See note 40 supra.
58. U.C.C. § 9-306, Comment 2(c); U.C.C. § 9-307.
59. U.C.C. § 9-309.
60. It would appear that the drafters of 9-306(2) and (3) should have made some provision
for the apparent conflict between setoff and a perfected security interest in proceeds, but the
failure to do so is not without basis in pre-Code law. Uniform Trust Receipts Act § 10, the
predecessor of 9-306(2), generally gave the secured party a claim to the proceeds upon a
debtor's sale of collateral, whether or not the sale was authorized by the secured party.
According to U.C.C. § 9-306, Comment 2(a), in some instances, it was said that the security
interest attached to the property substituted for the original collateral; in others, that the
debtor held the proceeds as trustee or agent for the secured party. However, the common law
right of setoff coexisted with this provision of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. The present
conflict under the Code easily could have existed under the predecessor statute as well.
61. United States v. Nat'l Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, 294 F.2d 385, 390-91 (2d
Cir. 1961); People ex rel Nordstrom v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 11 11. 2d 99, 106-07, 142
N.E.2d 26, 30-31 (1957).
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intended 9-306(2) to abrogate the right of setoff, or for the Code to
determine the priorities between 9-306(2) and setoff, a provision
similar to that in 9-104(l)"2 could have been inserted into 9-104(i).
Section 9-104(1) excludes from Article Nine coverage transfers of
interests in deposit accounts, except as to proceeds (9-306) and
priorities in proceeds (9-312).11 The failure to include such a provision in 9-104(i) indicates that the Code was not intended to affect
priorities between security interests and rights of setoff."4
In a related context, section 9-104(c) excludes artisans' liens from
the scope of Article Nine except for the priorities established by 93105 between such liens and perfected security interests. The drafters could have similarly incorporated a separate priorities section
dealing with setoff in 9-104(i). The absence of such a section further
evidences their intention that it is the common law, rather than the
Code, which resolves conflicts involving setoff against third party
funds.
In the event of insolvency proceedings, 9-306(4)(d)(i) 5 specifically
recognizes a continuing right of setoff against deposit accounts of
the debtor in which proceeds have been commingled with other
funds, whether or not a secured party has a perfected security interest in the proceeds. This recognition directly contradicts the assertion in Associates Discount Corp. that the drafters intended to abrogate a bank's common law right of setoff against proceeds. Furthermore, in recognizing the right of setoff against commingled proceeds, the Code has statutorily legitimized this right. By contrast,
under pre-Code law the matter was largely left to common law.
POST-CODE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
SETOFF AND SECURITY INTERESTS IN IDENTIFIABLE PROCEEDS

Although Associates Discount Corp. has not been expressly overruled or contradicted, later courts have disregarded its holding and
based their decisions regarding priority on pre-Code law rather than
9-306(2) and (3). The interest of a secured party in proceeds deposited in a bank account has been compared to the interest of a third
party in funds similarly deposited. Whether or not a secured party
has been permitted to recover against a bank which has setoff, depends on whether the particular court follows the knowledge/notice
62. U.C.C. § 9-104(1) [hereinafter cited as 9-104(1)].
63. U.C.C. § 9-312.
64. This is contrary to the holding of Associates Discount Corp. v. Fidelity Union Trust
Co., 111 N.J. Super. 353, 268 A.2d 330 (1970). See text accompanying notes 49-52 supra.
65. U.C.C. § 9-310 [hereinafter cited as 9-3101.
66. U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(i).
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or equitable/federal rule.
In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First National Bank of
Blue Island,7 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied
the pre-Code knowledge/notice rule adhered to by the state courts
of Illinois. In that case a tobacco products supplier (B & W), obtained a security interest in a wholesaler's current and future inventory, accounts receivable, and proceeds of the foregoing.
Four months later, the wholesaler issued several checks to B & W
in payment of purchase money advances made to the wholesaler.
These checks were drawn on an account containing proceeds from
the sale of the wholesaler's inventory and the collection of accounts
receivable. Although the balance in the corporate account was adequate to cover the checks, upon presentment by B & W the bank
represented that the funds in the account were insufficient. Thereafter, the bank obtained the oral approval and written direction of
the wholesaler to debit the wholesaler's corporate account in satisfaction of a personal note of the principals of the corporation held
by the bank. At the time, the note was not due.18 Under these circumstances, the court held that the bank had no right of setoff. It
was noted that when proceeds placed in the debtor's checking account are paid out in the operation of the debtor's business, recipients of the funds take free of any claims of the secured party. 9
Because of the bank's unorthodox conduct prior to the time of the
setoff, the court found that the transfer was outside the bank's
ordinary course of business. Therefore, the court reverted to a variant of the knowledge/notice rule, and charged the bank with constructive notice of the interest of B & W in the account. 0 This
holding, together with the fact that the court did not state or imply
that 9-306(2) was determinative of the rights or priorities of the
67. 504 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1974).
68. The court failed to consider two facts which would have determined the outcome of
this case without reference to the Code. The bank set off funds from a corporate account in
payment of a personal note. Furthermore, the note on which the bank based its setoff was
not fully matured. Since there was no mutual debtor/creditor relationship involved and since
the note involved had not yet matured, there was no right of setoff.
69. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-306, Comment 2(c) (1973). This comment states in pertinent
part:
Where cash proceeds are covered into the debtor's checking account and paid out
in the operation of the debtor's business, recipients of the funds of course take free
of any claim which the secured party may have in them as proceeds. What has been
said relates to payments and transfers in ordinary course. The law of fraudulent
conveyances would no doubt in appropriate cases support recovery of proceeds by
a secured party from a transferee out of ordinary course or otherwise in collusion
with the debtor to defraud the secured party.
70. 504 F.2d at 1002-04.
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parties, reaffirms the validity of using pre-Code law to determine
whether setoff against proceeds is valid.
In Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank of
Portageville,7 ' pre-Code setoff cases based on the. knowledge/notice
rule were employed to support a decision in favor of the secured
party. The action was brought against a bank by an automobile
financer which had a perfected security interest in proceeds of the
sale of certain automobiles. Approximately eighteen months after
the original security agreement had been entered into between the
financer and the debtor, the financer notified the debtor of its intent
to discontinue its floor plan financing of the debtor. The debtor
subsequently instructed his bank to set off against his account
funds due it by the debtor. The debtor's express intent was to prefer
the claim of the bank to that of the financer. The debtor refused,
however, to issue a check to the bank, insisting instead that the
bank debit his account. The bank complied, and the account, which
contained proceeds of automobile sales, was set off. The debtor also
informed the bank of checks drawn on the proceeds in his account
outstanding to the financer. All of these events, including the debit,
occurred after the close of the bank's business day. When the financer presented the proceeds checks for payment, the bank dishonored
them due to insufficient funds.
The court cited 9-306, Comment 2(c) with particular emphasis on
that portion of the comment which refers to the law of fraudulent
conveyances." It noted that in Missouri, one indicia of a fraudulent
conveyance is a transaction outside the usual course of business.
Although it did not find a fraudulent conveyance, the court nevertheless held that the debit was outside of the ordinary course of
business and therefore could not defeat the secured party's interest
in proceeds. The following facts were critical to this conclusion: (1)
the bank knew that there were checks in payment of proceeds outstanding to the plaintiff; (2) the debtor would not issue a check to
the bank in payment of his loan but insisted that the bank debit
his account; and (3) all of these events occurred after the close of
the business day. Although the court apparently sought to ground
its decision on the Code, the portion of the comment on which it
relied is nothing more than a reiteration of the common and statutory law of fraudulent conveyances, both of which pre-dated the
Code.73
71.
72.
73.

358 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
See note 69 supra.
See generally 37 C.J.S., Fraudulent Conveyances, §§ 1 et seq. (1943).
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The court did not confine its discussion to fraudulent conveyances, but further supported its conclusion with pre-Code Missouri
setoff cases that followed the knowledge/notice rule. The facts involved in the case were "sufficient to put the bank on inquiry as to
the possible trust character of all or part of the funds deposited in
[the debtor's] account."74 Whether the Universal C.I.T. decision is
based on the law of fraudulent conveyances or pre-Code setoff law,
or both, the result is the same; the opinion does not refer to or rely
on 9-306(2) to determine the validity of the setoff.
In Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee Western Bank,7 5 the
contest was between a bank which held a fully matured promissory
note of the debtor and a secured party with a perfected security
interest in the debtor's accounts receivable and their proceeds. The
secured party alleged that it held a prior perfected security interest
in the setoff funds, and that the bank knew or should have known
of that interest. The bank argued that notwithstanding the security
interest, the setoff was authorized by statute in Wisconsin.7 6 However, the court disregarded this defense, asserting that the Wisconsin statute did not address itself to third party funds.
The court also did not discuss whether the bank knew, or should
have known, that the funds on deposit were proceeds. Instead, it
reviewed prior Wisconsin case law dealing with setoff against third
party funds. Since the prior case law was unclear as to whether lack
of knowledge or notice supported setoff by the bank,7 7 the court took
the opportunity to specifically adopt the equitable rule.
The equitable rule is the better rule because it eliminates the
problems of proving knowledge on the part of an institution. This
rule is not harsh as applied to the bank because a bank is in a
superior position to all other creditors because it has funds of its
debtor at its disposal to immediately seize and apply as setoff
... .Other creditors can exercise the right of setoff only as a partial or full defense
to an action brought against them by the
78
debtor/creditor.
Although not articulated by the court, the reason for the holding in
favor of the secured party seems to be the likelihood that the bank
had not changed its position in reliance on the deposit.
The Commercial Discount case demonstrates another instance in
which a court, presented with a question of the validity of setoff
74. 358 F. Supp. at 325.
75. 61 Wis. 2d 671, 214 N.W.2d 33 (1974).
76. WiS. STAT. § 895.07 (1973).
77. 61 Wis. 2d at 681-82, 214 N.W.2d at 38-39.
78. Id. at 683, 214 N.W.2d at 39.
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against identifiable proceeds, declined to use 9-306(2) as the basis
for its decision. In this particular case, that fact is especially noteworthy because the court changed Wisconsin setoff law to the equitable rule, which in this case produced a result favorable to the
secured party. If the court was only interested in allowing recovery
to the secured party, it could have based its decision on 9-306(2).
Its failure to do so implies that 9-306(2) is not relevant to the resolution of the conflict between the parties, and that the holding in
Associates Discount Corp. is incorrect.
These courts resolved the conflict between a bank's right of setoff
against proceeds and a secured party's interest in those proceeds
based on pre-Code law. Whether these decisions are based on the
law of fraudulent conveyances, the knowledge/notice rule, or the
equitable/federal rule is of little import. What is significant is that
the courts have not adopted the holding of Associates Discount
Corp. that 9-306(2) abrogates a bank's right to set off proceeds
contained in a debtor's deposit account.
Fortunately, there appears to be unanimity among knowledge/notice jurisdictions regarding the definition of notice,79 as well
as the factual situations which result in findings of knowledge.80
79. A generally accepted definition of notice is knowledge of facts which would naturally
lead an honest and prudent person to inquiry. A bank will be charged with notice of everything which such inquiry, pursued in good faith, would disclose. E.g., United States v. BoothKelly Lumber Co., 246 F. 970 (9th Cir. 1917); German Am. Nat'l Bank of Lincoln v. Martin,
227 Ill. 629, 115 N.E. 721 (1917).
80. Knowledge has been found to exist in many different factual situations. These include: (1) the depositor described by account as one presumptively acting in an official or
fiduciary capacity, such as a designation of the depositor as a trustee, e.g., Keeney v. Bank
of Italy, 33 Cal. App. 515, 165 P. 735 (1917); Ryan Bros. v. Curwensville State Bank, 382 Pa.
248, 114 A.2d 178 (1955); United State Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Adoue, 104 Tex. 379, 137 S.W.
648 (1911); (2) in addition to appending a descriptive word to the depositor's name, other facts
exist, such as knowledge of the depositor's course of business, familiarity with his financial
affairs, or unusual facts connected with the deposit, e.g., Bank of Guntersville v. Crayter, 199
Ala. 599, 75 S. 7 (1917); Shepard v. Meridian Nat'l Bank, 149 Ind. 532, 48 N.E. 346 (1897);
Baker v. New York Nat'l Exch. Bank, 100 N.Y. 31, 2 N.E. 452 (1885); (3) a deposit to a
debtor's account of a check or note indicating the third person's interest therein, e.g., American Trust & Banking Co. v. Boone, 102 Ga. 202, 29 S.E. 182 (1897); Wegersley v. Midland
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 184 Minn. 393, 238 N.W. 792 (1931); Hall v. Windsor Sav. Bank, 97
Vt. 125, 121 A. 582, aff'd on rehearing,97 Vt. 142, 124 A. 593 (1933). See also Union Stock
Yards Bank v. Gillespie, 137 U.S. 411 (1890), holding that although a bank is not ordinarily
bound to inquire as to the source of a depositor's money, much less as to the depositor's
obligations to third parties concerning such money, in certain circumstances, such as particular deposits or lines of deposits, the bank is barred from treating the deposit as if it were the
depositor's own money. Where such circumstances exist, a bank will be held to have knowledge, imputed or otherwise, that the funds used to satisfy the debtor's indebtedness to it were
the property of another. See also Kerner v. Kinsey, 384 Ill. 180, 51 N.E.2d 126 (1943);
Kamfner v. Auburn Park Trust & Say. Bank, 344 Ill. 200, 176 N.E. 363 (1931); Chicago Title
& Trust Co. v. Central Trust Co., 312 III. 396, 144 N.E. 165 (1924); Live Stock Exchange,
Inc. v. State Bank of Roseville, 249 IlI. App. 44 (1928).
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Likewise, minority rule states tend to agree on what consitutes a
change in position.' Therefore, while the law of setoff against proceeds encompasses both a majority and minority rule, it is not further complicated by different interpretations in each of the fifty
states.
The failure of the Code to deal with setoff against proceeds allows
the dichotomy between the majority and minority positions to subvert one of the main purposes of the Code, i.e., to make the law
"uniform among the various jurisdictions.""2 Secured creditors and
banks, faced with ever increasing interstate transactions, are forced
to familiarize themselves with the setoff law of each individual state
instead of being able to rely on a uniform code.
PROPOSAL FOR AMENDMENT OF ARTICLE NINE

Instilling meaning into the term "identifiable" by use of common
law concepts pursuant to 1-10311 is not particularly vexatious to
potential interested parties. However, the use of the common law
of setoff in resolving the conflict between setoff and security interests in identifiable proceeds is quite offensive to secured parties.
Since the rights of secured parties in proceeds are created by and
perfected under the Code, they would prefer that 9-306 take precedence over setoff law.
The enactment of the Code raises the question whether the right
of setoff has become obsolete and should be abolished. Setoff has
been used by the banking industry frequently throughout the 20th
century. Typically, at least in knowledge/notice jurisdictions, a
bank does not enter into a financing situation relying only on an
account, yet it may very well expect to receive the benefit of setoff
in the event of default by the debtor. When a bank has a right of
It has been held that knowledge of the nature of a business, by itself is not sufficient to
put a bank upon inquiry. By analogy, neither should mere knowledge of the existence of a
security agreement with a third party under which proceeds are to be paid directly to the
third party, be sufficient to place a bank upon inquiry as to the source of funds on deposit
with it. See, e.g., Beaver Boards Cos. v. Imbrie & Co., 287 F. 158 (9th Cir. 1923), aff'd on
rehearing, Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hosier, 295 F. 611 (9th Cir. 1923), rev'd on other grounds,
267 U.S. 276 (1925); Kimmell v. Bean, 68 Kan. 598, 75 P. 1118 (1904).
81. Cox v. Metropolitan State Bank, Inc., 138 Colo. 576, 336 P.2d 742 (1959); Peoples
State Bank v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 213 Ind. 235, 12 N.E.2d 123 (1938); Platts v. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank, 130 Minn. 219, 153 N.W. 514 (1915); Allen Dudley & Co., v. First Nat'l Bank,
122 Neb. 443, 240 N.W. 522 (1932); Sherts v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 342 Pa. 337, 21 A.2d 18
(1941); Feurifoy v. Boswell, 162 S.C. 107, 160 S.E. 156, petitionfor rehearingdenied, 161 S.E.
927, (1931); National Indemnity Co. v. Spring Branch State Bank, 162 Tex. 521, 348 S.W.2d
528 (1961).
82. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c).
83. See note 40 supra.
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setoff with the ability to monitor an account and resort to setoff if
necessary, a default situation may be permitted to exist with the
expectation that additional time will enable the debtor to improve
his financial condition. To totally abolish the right of setoff as a
resolution to the conflict of interest might create serious confusion
in the banking industry, and cause banks to be more cautious in
extending financing to individuals and small businesses. Further,
banks would be more likely to declare defaults and bring suit on
past due notes immediately, in order to avoid involvement in insolvency proceedings, instead of allowing debtors time to informally
reorganize.
If setoff is abolished it would become necessary for banks to turn
to the courts for adjudication of the respective rights of themselves
as creditors and their depositors as debtors. Depositors might well
be expected to withdraw all funds from banks prior to the conclusion
of such litigation. The possibility of withdrawal in every instance in
which a bank sues to recover on a mature obligation of its depositor
is a high price for banks to pay in order that secured parties might
be free from setoff against proceeds. The cost is especially high
when one considers how constantly setoff is exercised and how infrequently it is exercised against accounts containing proceeds. This
problem could be solved if the courts allowed a bank to freeze the
funds on deposit until a final judicial determination was reached.
On the other hand, abolishing setoff would increase the number of
filed cases, thus further inundating already overloaded courts.84 One
major benefit of setoff has been that it allows parties to settle issues
of indebtedness outside of the courtroom.
One argument in favor of abolishing setoff is that a bank should
only have the same opportunities available to other creditors to
obtain security for the extension of credit. Because present law allows a secured bank to setoff against funds on deposit rather than
going against the collateral it holds, 5 banks have an edge over other
secured parties. Even if a bank does not demand security, it still has
rights superior to those of other general creditors and a possibility
of defeating a secured party's interest in proceeds.
Since banks exercise setoff on a daily basis, and since there is
normally no conflict with secured creditors by so doing, the right of
setoff should not be abolished altogether. Instead, Article Nine
could be amended to more evenly balance the interest of banks in
84. At present, unless the setoff is improper, the debtor usually does not contest it in
court. Thus, setoff conflicts normally involve third parties and banks.
85. Olsen v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Aurora, 91 Il. App. 2d 365, 234 N.E.2d 547 (1968).
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setoff against the interest of secured parties in proceeds, while still
allowing setoff to remain a viable right. The drafting of such an
amendment, however, would be replete with difficulties.
One possibility is an amendment that would establish a uniform
law of setoff. Such a provision would have to regulate the time at
which the right of setoff arises, and when that right could be exercised against proceeds.
However, setoff, by its nature, does not come within the specifically stated scope of Article Nine. Section 9-102(2)" provides in
part: "This Article applies to security interests created by contract. . . ." The Official Comment to this section enlarges on this
concept: "The main purpose of this section is to bring all consenual
security interests in personal property and fixtures under this Article. .. ."I' Setoff may be provided for by contract, but it is not
created by contract. Furthermore, setoff is not consensual, since it
is a unilateral action by a bank, with or without the consent of the
depositor. For this reason, setoff was excluded from coverage by
Article Nine under 9-104(i). It would therefore be outside of the
scope of Article Nine to provide when the right of setoff exists, and
under what conditions it is properly exercisable. The goal of a uniform law of setoff created by amending Article Nine is therefore
inapposite, if not legally repugnant. Moreover, it is questionable
whether an amendment should be that sweeping since the conflict
between banks' and secured parties' rights arises in a limited context.
In the conflict over identifiable proceeds, a resolution perhaps
could be reached by allowing banks, to the exclusion of other creditors, to perfect security interests in deposit accounts, subject to the
right of depositors to withdraw from such accounts in the ordinary
course of business. Priorities between banks and secured parties
with perfected security interests in proceeds deposited into bank
accounts could then be determined on the basis of the first to file
or perfect rule."' While such an amendment would provide an effective priority rule, it would discriminate in favor of banks, and would
86. U.C.C. § 9-102(2).
87. U.C.C. § 9-102, Official Comment (emphasis added).
88. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a). Since a bank would have possession of the funds in the account,
it would have to be considered under U.C.C. § 9-305 to have a perfected security interest as
of the time of the establishment of the account in a simultaneous debt situation. If the
debtor's obligation to the bank arose subsequent to the opening of the account, the security
interest would arise at the time that the debt was incurred, if provision was made therefor in
the security agreement. In the antecedent debtsituation, a bank would be required to take a
security interest in after-acquired deposit accounts under U.C.C. §§ 9-108, 9-204 in order to
protect itself.
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not eliminate the right of setoff. Indeed, it would give banks the
right to take collateral not presently allowed them under the Code,
while setoff would continue to exist under common law and statute.9 Furthermore, as the Official Comment to 9-104(1) states, while
deposit accounts are frequently offered as collateral, "such transactions are often quite special, do not fit easily under a general commercial statute and are adequately covered by existing law."9
Any attempt to codify a priority system between setoff and a
secured party's interest in proceeds, that would continue to rely on
common law and setoff statutes to determine when a right of setoff
arises, would result in a destruction of the right to setoff against
proceeds. The drafting of a section similar to 9-312,"' but applicable
to setoff, would require a determination as to when the interest of
the bank exercising setoff vests. A right of setoff arises when there
is a mutual debtor/creditor relationship and when the debt of the
depositor is fully matured. However, this is an inchoate interest
only. A bank receives an actual interest in an account only when it
takes steps to effectuate the setoff." Therefore, since a bank's interest arises only upon the exercise of setoff, if a security interest in
proceeds was perfected before the actual time of setoff, a secured
party would uniformly defeat the interest of a bank arising from
setoff.
Furthermore, a closer examination of the cases in which setoff was
held to be properly exercisable reveals that the courts have not
treated setoff against third party funds as a priority problem. The
rule in setoff cases is absolute. In knowledge/notice jurisdictions,
regardless of seniority and perfection of the interest of the third
party, if a bank has no knowledge or notice before exercising setoff
against third party funds, the bank prevails. 3 In equitable/federal
89. The Code could not explicitly repeal existing setoff statutes, any more than it would
overrule the common law of setoff, since setoff is not a security interest and is not consistent
with the terms of Article Nine.
90. U.C.C. § 9-104(1), Comment 7.
91. U.C.C. § 9-312.
92. U.C.C. § 4-303(1)(b); U.C.C. § 4-303, Comment, which provides that the effective
time of setoff is when setoff is actually made. See also Baker v. Nat'l City Bank of Cleveland,
511 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1975); Reed v. Barnett Nat'l Bank, 250 F. 983 (5th Cir. 1918); Niblock
v. Park Nat'l Bank, 169 Ill.
517, 48 N.E. 438 (1897). Gillett v. Williamsville State Bank, 310
Ill. App. 395, 34 N.E.2d 552 (1941); Whitewater Community & Say. Bank v. United State
Bank of Crystal Lake, 224 Ill.
App. 26 (1922); Peoples State Bank v. Caterpillar Tractor, 213
Ind. 235, 12 N.E.2d 123 (1938).
93. The courts in knowledge/notice jurisdictions could resolve the conflict in another way.
When a secured party perfects a security interest, he is considered under the Code to have
given constructive notice to the public of his interest in the collateral. If the courts were to
determine that such perfection constitutes notice under setoff law, then the interest of the
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jurisdictions, if a bank changes its position in reliance on a deposit,
the bank prevails. This is in accord with the very nature of setoff,
and should not be changed by an amendment to the Code. If a bank
meets the requirements for setoff in the jurisdiction in which it is
located, it should prevail against any interest which a secured party
might have in proceeds in the account.
This position is consistent with the clear meaning of 9-104(i), 94
with the intent of the drafters of the Code,9 5 and with rules of statutory construction. 6 Furthermore, there appears to be no feasible
way to amend Article Nine to provide otherwise. 7 It seems unlikely
that judicial and legislative bodies, which have established and fostered the law of setoff, would be willing to place it in a position
subservient to security interests by judicial reconstruction of the
common law of setoff or by legislative action outside of the Code.
Even if they would be willing to do so, such a divergence from
present setoff law would necessitate a redefinition, if not the destruction, of the entire law of setoff. This course of action would
probably result in chaos and widespread opposition within the
banking industry. Considering the comparatively infrequent conflicts between setoff and security interests, as opposed to the widespread reliance on and frequent use of setoff by the banking industry, it would appear that such a solution would be neither equitable
nor reasonable.
However, Article Nine's treatment of artisans' liens suggests an
approach which might be taken with respect to amending the Code
to clarify the relation between 9-306 and the common law of setoff.
Under 9-104(c), 9 artisans' liens are excluded from Article Nine
except as to priority of such liens since "it was thought inappropriate and unnecessary. . .to attempt a general codification of that
lien structure [artisans' liens] which is in considerable part determined by local conditions and which is far removed from ordinary
commercial financing." 9 Nevertheless, 9-310100 provides a priority
rule between artisans' liens and perfected security interests: unless
a statute of a particular jurisdiction states otherwise, in all cases an
secured party would prevail over that of the bank in setoff. However, to date, no court has
rendered such a holding, and it is questionable whether they should since this construction
of notice is peculiar to the Code, which does not apply to setoff.
94. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
95. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
96. See text accompanying notes 61-66 supra.
97. See text accompanying notes 86-92 supra.
98. U.C.C. § 9-104(c).
99. U.C.C. § 9-104(c), Comment 3.
100. U.C.C. § 9-310.
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artisan's lien takes priority over a prior perfected security interest.
This rule is based on the premise that an artisan adds to the value
of the collateral and has a security interest to the extent that he
added to such value. Thus, in theory, a secured party loses nothing
by a rule granting the artisan priority.
Setoff resembles the artisan's lien to the extent that state law
determines when the right of setoff arises and when it may be exercised. As in the case of artisans' liens, state law regarding setoff
varies between majority and minority jurisdictions. In addition, setoff is not involved in most commercial transactions. Setoff is dissimilar from artisans' liens in that a bank adds nothing to the value
of the collateral. Therefore, there are no special equities which
would arise in favor of banks as they do in favor of artisans.
Nevertheless, a similar amendment with respect to setoff would
do much to clarify the position that setoff occupies under the Code.
Section 9-104(i) could be amended to include determination as to
priorities in proceeds, as does 9-104(1). A new section could then be
added which would clarify that state common law and/or statute
determines whether a right of setoff exists, and when such a right
may be exercised. If a right of setoff exists, then by operation of state
law it would take priority over any security interest in proceeds,
whether perfected or not.
The benefit of such an amendment would be threefold. First, it
would remind creditors to stay abreast of the financial condition of
debtors allowed to dispose of collateral. Otherwise, if a debtor defaults on an obligation to a bank which holds a deposit account
containing proceeds, the bank might have an indefeasible right to
setoff against the proceeds. Second, practitioners would be given
direction in resolving the conflict between setoff and perfected security interests in proceeds. Finally, those courts which have demonstrated a tendency to apply Article Nine to determine priorities
between setoff and security interests in proceeds would have statutory authority on which to rely when faced with cases involving a
bank's setoff against proceeds.
CONCLUSION

Because the Code excludes setoff from coverage by Article Nine,
the courts have looked to common law to resolve the conflict which
arises when a bank sets off against an account containing identifiable proceeds belonging to a secured party. Following the thrust of
these judicial interpretations, it is possible for a bank's right of
setoff to defeat a security interest in proceeds, even where those
proceeds are identifiable and the interest is perfected. Because of
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the dichotomy in the common law concerning setoff, banks have
different rights to set off against proceeds depending on the jurisdiction in which they are located.
The only way in which to preserve a secured party's interest in
identifiable proceeds against a proper exercise of setoff would be to
abolish setoff against proceeds. However, the policy developed in
favor of setoff over years of judicial and legislative efforts, in addition to the lobbying strength of the banking industry, would militate
against such an occurrence. As a preferred alternative, Article Nine
should be amended to make it clear that when state law affords a
bank a right of setoff, that right will take precedence over a secured
party's perfected security interest in identifiable proceeds.
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